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Abstract 
Policy debates surrounding poverty and inequality try to find practical 
solutions to what we should do to tackle these phenomena. But what are 
the grounds for being concerned about poverty or about inequality? To what 
extent do these overlap? These questions invite us to explore the 
conceptual links between the two notions from the standpoint of their 
normative justifications. This paper clarifies the normative debate 
surrounding poverty and inequality, highlighting both moral and non-moral 
reasons that ground our concerns. The result is a clear map of the key 
philosophical positions, connected to current empirical debates in social 
policy. What emerges from this analysis is the possibility of endorsing a 
broader social justice justification for which poverty and inequality do not 
generate competing concerns, but see, instead, our normative reasons to 
care about both overlap.  
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Summary 
 
Why should we care about poverty and inequality? 
 
Policy debates surrounding poverty and inequality try to find practical 
solutions to what we should do to tackle these phenomena. But why 
should we care about poverty? Why should we care about inequality? 
Do our reasons for caring about one contrast with our reasons for 
caring about the other? Identifying these different reasons can lead 
us to claim that we should prioritise one issue over the other and can 
justify a different policy focus. This research outlines different 
philosophical positions and theories that underlie our concerns about 
poverty and inequality and explores the extent to which these are 
compatible and can, in fact, overlap.  
 
Giving priority to inequality 
 
A rich tradition in philosophy focuses on inequality: the basic idea this 
tradition supports is that inequality constitutes injustice. A ‘just’ 
society not only affirms and secures basic rights and liberties for all 
citizen; but it also requires a) equality of opportunity and b) that 
social and economic inequalities should always benefit the worst-off 
(Rawls,1971) for example by increasing the overall size of the ‘cake’ 
available to be divided. In practice, tackling poverty may be 
necessary to move towards a just society but poverty is thought to 
“follow from political injustice… once the gravest forms of political 
injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least decent) social 
policies and establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, 
these great evils will eventually disappear” (Rawls, 1999, 6–7).  
 
Equality of what? This question generated a longrunning debate in 
philosophy (Cohen, 1989; Sen 1980) arguing about whether social 
justice obliges us to go beyond focusing on resources, and wealth and 
income (Anderson 1999, Wolff, 2015; Fraser 1998; 2007). The 
distribution of these is seen as connected to asymmetrical 
relationships of political power, of status, and also of exclusion and 
discrimination. Inequalities of wealth and income are important 
determinants of these social inequalities, but overcoming 
distributional inequalities is not sufficient to achieve social equality, 
because, for example, certain forms of exclusion can be rooted in 
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reasons other than the possession of material resources (e.g. gender, 
race or disability). 
 
Giving priority to poverty 
 
Sufficiency views 
So called “sufficiency” views stress that “what is important from the 
point of view of morality is not that everyone should have the same 
but that each should have enough” (Frankfurt, 1987, 21-22). It is 
whether people have good lives, not how their lives compare to 
others, that we should care about. This position can support 
redistribution policies, but only because they might be instrumentally 
necessary to reach sufficiency. Given the choice between a) achieving 
sufficiency through redistribution of income and wealth inequalities 
and b) reaching identical gains for the worst-off with equal or greater 
gains for the better-off, there is no reason to favour the former 
solution over the latter. Sufficiency positions thus justify being 
concerned about poverty, but distinguish this sharply from being 
concerned about inequality. 
 
Humanitarian approaches 
A perspective that is uniquely related to poverty stresses 
humanitarian reasons to help the poor, putting ‘humanity before 
justice’ (Campbell, 2007; Singer 1972). According to these views, our 
moral reason to care about poverty springs from the sheer horrible 
suffering that is associated with it. This approach has some important 
upshots:  
1) humanitarian aid is not sensitive to how a certain state of affairs 
came to be.  
2) this position can lead to rather radical conclusions because it holds 
that our duty to aid is demanded on all of us, as individuals, in 
accordance to our capacity and irrespective to proximity. This calls 
into question a focus on domestic poverty over global poverty 
(Singer, 1972, 232). 
3) while it might be that extreme experiences in the context of global 
and absolute poverty elicit this “elemental response of aiding”, these 
intuitions are not always clear in relation to domestic and relative 
poverty. 
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Human rights approaches 
Freedom from poverty can also be considered as a fundamental 
human right. Rights-based views generally consider poverty as a 
harm that is possible to foresee and avoid and that infringes on 
human rights (rights humans have simply in virtue of being human). 
These approaches offer strong justifications for policies intended to 
eliminate poverty. At the same time, especially since they focus on 
‘subsistence rights’ and on extreme and absolute poverty, it might 
seem that such views do not in turn justify concerns with relative 
poverty or inequality (Gewirth, 1996, 72-73, 110). 
Some authors also stress that the causes of poverty are of moral 
significance (Thomas Pogge, 2002; 2007): we care about the reasons 
why there is persistent poverty in the face of material abundance. 
According to Pogge, “severe poverty today, while no less horrific than 
that experienced by the early American settlers, is fundamentally 
different in context and causation. Its persistence is not forced on us 
by natural contingencies of soil, seeds, or climate. Rather, its 
persistence is driven by the ways that economic interactions are 
structured” (2007, 3). Instead of solely caring about the 
consequences, such as the suffering experienced by the poor, this 
view focuses on the relations that brought these consequences about.  
 
How reasons for caring about poverty and inequality overlap 
 
Human Dignity 
The approaches discussed in the last section can support a view for 
which tackling poverty, especially extreme poverty, has priority over 
tackling distribution gaps. At the same time though, recognizing the 
priority of poverty “need not commit us to the very different assertion 
that this is all that justice requires” (De Vita, 2007, 108; Beitz, 2001). 
Both poverty and inequality can be seen as violations of human 
dignity. As such, the two are inextricably linked: they both introduce 
a distortion in economic, social and political relationships (Fleurbaey, 
2007). We can thus have an overlapping concern with poverty and 
inequality that originates from a common commitment to respecting 
human dignity.  
 
Deprivation and capabilities 
A broader concern with deprivation can lead us to care about both 
poverty and inequality: in fact, the social exclusion, material 
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deprivation and disadvantage that result from these are mutually 
reinforcing. Capability approaches (Sen, 1995; Nussbaum, 2006) can 
be understood as supporting this kind of view: poverty and inequality 
are both barriers to people’s capabilities to function in ways that 
elemental to human life within society. They are barriers to what 
people can be and do. 
 
Instrumental reasons 
We can also have instrumental reasons to care about poverty and 
inequality: we care because they are obstacles to other social, 
economic and political goals. In this sense, our interest in tackling 
them follows from the fact that poverty and inequality are associated 
with certain consequences. For example, some current research 
suggests that inequality has negative effects on social cohesion 
(Bridstall, 2007), political stability (Stewart, 2013; Salomon, 2011) 
and democratic participation (Solt 2008, 2010). We can also care 
about inequality because it is economically inefficient (Stewart, 2013; 
Solomon, 2011; Wade 2005), or because it slows down growth and 
development (World Bank 2006, Benabou, 1996; Berg and Ostry, 
2011; Stiglitz, 2012, 2015) or because it has a negative effect on 
social mobility (Corak, 2013). This evidence needs to be balanced 
against classic claims that inequality has a positive effect on growth 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Kaldor 1957) as well cases where, for 
instance, inequality and poverty trends appear to move in different 
directions (Toth, 2014; Forster and Vleminckx, 2004). 
Generally, in order to claim instrumental reasons to avoid generating 
or exacerbating inequalities, we need empirical evidence that 
supports the links that connect inequality to these different social and 
political phenomena. Notably, even someone who gives priority to 
poverty can hold that there are instrumental reasons to care about 
inequality, recognising the mechanisms through which inequality 
contributes to poverty.  
 
Does responsibility matter in relation to poverty and 
inequality? 
 
Who is responsible for poverty and inequality? Questions of 
responsibility seem to arise in relation to both poverty and inequality: 
these phenomena, are seen to have some relation to people’s 
behaviour and choices, but also to social institutions. 
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Attributing responsibility to the poor or to the worst off 
We can have humanitarian concerns or reasons based on human 
rights to care about poverty. From these standpoints, issues of 
responsibility are less relevant. But in relation to both poverty and 
inequality, many ethical theories think that there is a significant moral 
difference between those who are worst off through no fault of their 
own and those who are responsible for their condition (Dworkin, 
1981; Arneson, 1989, Cohen, 1989).  
 
Attributing collective responsibility for the causes of poverty and 
inequality 
Responsibility is discussed not just in relation to individuals but also 
in terms of our collective responsibility for structures and institutions 
(Cruft et al. 2015; Tasioulas, 2015). We can see how structural 
responsibility is particularly central for rights-based views: the 
legitimacy of institutions is dependent on their fairness and on their 
ability to respect moral rights.  
 
Both at the individual and structural level, we find parallel problems 
in establishing how certain states of affairs came to be and how a 
meaningful idea of responsibility should be defined (Wolff et al, 2015; 
Anderson, 1999; Fleurbaey, 2007; Christman, 1998; Young, 2003). 
While the discourse of responsibility and desert is prominent in the 
way our society approaches poverty and inequality, these difficulties 
invite us to consider the limits of our intuitions, and require us to 
focus on the causes and processes underlying both poverty and 
inequality. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Different philosophical theories provide different reasons why we 
should care about poverty and inequality and for some authors these 
appear to be in conflict, inviting us to prioritise one issue over the 
other. These different theories also lead us to focus on different 
aspects of inequality (e.g. one can focus solely on differences of 
wealth and income or on the inequalities that characterise social 
relationships) and on different aspects of poverty (one can focus on 
global poverty over domestic poverty; or focus on absolute rather 
than relative poverty; or care about how the poor came to be in this 
position or not). 
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Nevertheless, it is possible to hold that our concerns with poverty and 
inequality are not mutually exclusive: we can hold that both poverty 
and inequality are relevant for human deprivation, or that they are 
both violating human dignity, or that they stand in mutually 
reinforcing relationships and hinder other social goals.  
 
A ‘pluralist view’ incorporates different justifications: one can 
prioritise poverty (seeing it as the most important determinant of 
deprivation, or acknowledging human rights and humanitarian 
concerns) while also allowing that inequality matters, both in itself 
and instrumentally. In this context, the growing empirical literature 
being explored in the wider programme of research of which this 
paper is a part that connects poverty and inequality and points at the 
mechanisms through which poverty is entrenched by greater 
inequality is highly relevant.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
What are the grounds for being concerned about poverty or about 
inequality? To what extent do these overlap? These questions invite 
us to explore the conceptual links between the two notions from the 
standpoint of their normative justifications. In what follows I will 
discuss the various philosophical perspectives on both moral and non-
moral reasons that ground our concern about these phenomena. In 
section 1 I will firstly explore how inequality has occupied the centre 
stage for theories of social justice and then point at important 
differences in how the concept has been articulated. Through a 
discussion of the concept of ‘sufficiency’ in section 2, I will move on 
to consider poverty as the basic concept, with inequality significant 
only in so far as it contributes to meeting a certain minimum 
threshold. Social justice, humanitarian and human rights 
justifications in relation to poverty are discussed. Lastly, section 3 
briefly focuses on how questions concerning responsibility have been, 
in different respects, shaping the debate around both inequality and 
poverty.  
 
2.  Inequality 
 
Our special normative concern with distributional inequality derives 
from the idea that inequality constitutes injustice. In this sense, 
Rawls’s work on social justice remains the obvious reference point. 
Rawls (1971) advances a political conception of justice that pertains 
to the ‘basic structure of society’ and offers the conditions of fairness 
for political institutions through two principles (ibid. 42-43). These 
principles, he argues, are the terms of cooperation free and equal 
citizens would agree to under fair conditions and they are expressive 
of citizens’ respect for one another as moral persons. According to 
Rawls the consensus reached over the principles of justice does not 
entail a comprehensive theory of the ‘good’. It is because of this that, 
rather than referring to particular ends, Rawls’s theory is explicitly 
focused on ‘social primary goods’, the ‘all-purpose means’ which are 
valuable whatever one’s individual conception of the good is. These 
primary goods include liberty, opportunity, the powers and 
prerogatives of office, the social bases of self-respect, income and 
wealth. The first principle affirms for all citizens familiar basic rights 
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and liberties; while the second constrains social and economic 
inequalities by requiring fair equality of opportunity and affirming the 
‘difference principle’, which regulates the distribution of wealth and 
income. According to this principle, a just society is one where 
inequalities of wealth and income work to the greatest benefit of the 
least-advantaged members of society.  
 
As a so called ‘ideal theory’, Rawls’s view attempts to set out the 
principles of justice that abstract from particular conditions but also 
provide the model to which society should aspire. At the same time, 
the ideal nature of the theory allows us to understand why poverty 
does not figure prominently in this discussion. According to Rawls 
poverty is one of the “great evils of human history”, but it is thought 
to fundamentally “follow from political injustice… once the gravest 
forms of political injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least 
decent) social policies and establishing just (or at least decent) basic 
institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear” (Rawls, 1999, 
6–7). Instead, in this ideal approach, inequality is the primary 
concern, because it defines the grounds of justice.  
 
Much of the debate that The Theory of Justice originated preserves 
this focus on inequality and has developed both in the direction of 
spelling out the “currency” of justice (Cohen, 1989), the things which 
people should have equal amounts of in an equal society; but also in 
the direction of articulating the principles defining which inequalities 
amount to injustice (Dworkin, 1981a; 1981b; Frankfurt, 1987, Parfit, 
1998). Answers to the question “equality of what?” present us with a 
rich debate juxtaposing thinner or thicker conceptions of equality. On 
the one hand, libertarian perspectives dismiss the concern with 
distributive patterns and consider fair treatment and equality of 
process as the solely relevant definitions of justice: respecting liberty 
and fundamental, non-contractual, entitlements to ownership that 
trump concerns of social economic distribution. At the other end of 
the spectrum, we find views that oppose the Rawlsian emphasis on 
resourcism, which focuses predominantly on distributional 
inequalities (Sen 1980, Robeyns and Brighouse, 2010). Developing 
these insights, conceptions of social or democratic equality (Anderson 
1999, Wolff, 2015) have stressed that we should be concerned with 
patterns of socialization, defining social relations, rather than merely 
patterns of distribution. According to these views, inequality is 
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conceived as a fundamentally relational notion. They do not dismiss 
the importance of inequalities of wealth and income and hold that 
certain patterns of distributions are inextricably connected to 
relationships that fail to amount to those of a ‘society of equals’. This 
means that, on the one hand, distributional features of society are 
important determinants of social inequalities, which consist of 
asymmetrical relationships of political power, or status, but also of 
exclusion and discrimination. On the other hand, overcoming 
distributional inequalities is not sufficient to achieve social equality, 
because, for example, certain forms of exclusion can be rooted in 
reasons other than the possession of material resources (such as 
gender, race or disability). In this sense, we can see a more explicit 
attention to forms of horizontal inequality1. This also means that, in 
these relational models of equality, the relevance of distributional 
inequalities is relative to the extent to which they can result in social 
inequalities, for example by being converted in social status and 
political power. In this direction, Nancy Fraser (1998; 2007) has 
proposed a broad conception of social justice as “parity of 
participation”: in order for this to be achieved, economic 
redistribution, social recognition and political representation should 
not be considered antithetical and mutually exclusive, but seen as 
rather defining different, entwined and reciprocally reinforcing 
dimensions of justice.  
 
Views that see inequality as central to social justice need to be 
distinguished from instrumental views, according to which our 
concern with inequality is derivative of other social, economic and 
                                                 
1
 There seems to be little attention in the philosophical literature about the 
question ‘equality between whom?’, which led, in the social policy literature, to 
distinguishing horizontal and vertical inequality. Sometimes these notions seem 
to be simply articulated in different terms. We find, for example, Rawls’s 
difference principle as fundamentally overlapping with concerns with vertical 
inequality. As it is hinted here, a lot of the criticisms developed by authors holding 
a relational view of equality (and also thanks to the crucial contribution of 
capability approaches) points at the limits of resourcism emphasizing the 
cogency of concerns with horizontal inequalities. It is important to stress that 
underlying commitments of the philosophical literature to either horizontal or 
vertical inequality can be extrapolated, but they are, for the most part, not 
directly addressed. Disentangling the general unclarity surrounding these notions 
in the philosophical literature would be of particular interest in order to engage 
and contribute to the ongoing debate in social policy. This is, however, beyond 
the scope of this contribution. 
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political goals. From this perspective our interest in inequality follows 
from the empirical fact that inequality is associated with certain 
consequences. It can, for example, hinder social cohesion (Bridstall, 
2007), political stability (Stewart, 2013; Salomon, 2011) and 
democratic participation (Solt 2008, 2010). Moreover it can have a 
negative effect on economic efficiency, by reducing human capital or 
the size of domestic markets (Stewart, 2013; Solomon, 2011; Wade 
2005); on development (World Bank 2006); on social mobility (Corak, 
2013); and on growth (IMF, 2014; Benabou, 1996; Berg and Ostry, 
2011). Stiglitz’s work (2012, 2015) in this area has been particularly 
resonant: it points at how, reversing longstanding assumptions, 
inequality can be shown to lead to weaker economic performance, 
negatively affecting medium-term growth and tending to shorten 
growth spells (Cingano, 2014). In all these cases, there are prudential 
reasons to avoid generating or exacerbating inequalities because 
these are considered obstacles to the achievement of further goals. 
In this sense, empirical evidence that disproves such links, or 
suggests a different relation between inequality and these primary 
goals, can justify abandoning our concern with inequality in a way 
that a view conceiving inequality as central to social justice does not. 
This is not to say that empirical evidence has no place in views that 
conceive inequalities as basically unjust: empirical evidence shows 
particular states of affairs to be unjust. In these cases, evidence can 
thus support the case for taking particular actions, while also 
explaining the specific mechanisms generating inequalities. Empirical 
evidence does not, however, ground our normative concern with 
inequality.  
Here it is worth noting that utilitarianism also presents reasons for 
caring about inequalities that are instrumental, contingent and 
incidental. In fact, while utilitarianism holds an egalitarian principle in 
treating the interests of all equally, it lacks a concept of justice or 
fairness that isn’t derivative of its own guiding principle of maximizing 
utility. This means that, for utilitarians, the extent of inequality should 
depend on which distribution maximizes utility. This position remains 
contingent on the empirical connections between inequality and utility 
maximization. While this can lead to highly egalitarian conclusions, 
for example on the basis of arguments for equality based on 
diminishing marginal utility (Pigou 1920), it can also justify material 
inequality in order to avoid negative incentives to work or promote 
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positive incentives rewarding productivity. Because utilitarianism 
defines what is right only as a function of the good, understood as 
utility maximization, it allows to justify the inequalities instrumental 
to this good.2 
Finally, within the debate surrounding inequality and social justice we 
find views that deny that the demands of justice involve comparative 
principles, let alone equality principles. So, Harry Frankfurt (1987) 
has stressed that “what is important from the point of view of morality 
is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have 
enough. If everyone had enough it would be of no moral consequence 
whether some had more than others” (21-2). Frankfurt refutes the 
argument for equality based on diminishing marginal utility and 
discusses how the concept of "equal share" is simpler and more 
accessible than the concept of "having enough” and has thus been - 
mistakenly, in his view - the focus of attention. Frankfurt sees 
comparative perspectives implicit in our concern with inequality as 
fundamentally mistaken and potentially alienating: the mistake “lies 
in supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less 
than another regardless of how much either of them has” (34). 
Instead, a sufficiency view gives normative priority to reaching the 
central standards of a dignified life: it is whether people have good 
lives, not how their lives compare to others, that we should care 
about. Setting aside for the moment what “having enough” entails, 
we can see that it is possible for a sufficiency view such as Frankfurt’s 
to be consistent with Rawls’s difference principle, but this is only 
incidentally and contingently so. Instrumentally, redistribution and 
policies tackling vertical inequalities might be necessary to reach 
sufficiency; however, given the choice between achieving the goal of 
sufficiency through redistribution that diminishes wealth inequalities 
and reaching identical gains for the worse-off with equal or greater 
gains for the better-off, there is no reason to favour the former over 
the latter. Frankfurt’s sufficiency position thus justifies being 
concerned about poverty, but distinguishes it sharply from being 
concerned about inequality. While it must be noted that Frankfurt’s 
                                                 
2 I cannot do justice here to the array of utilitarian positions that have elaborated 
on these themes. Given the centrality of the utilitarian influence in economic 
debates I pointed at the inherent difficulties in resolving tensions between utility 
and justice. For further discussion of possible utilitarian solutions and rule 
utilitarianism see Hooker (2014). 
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target here is very narrow (he is focusing on discrepancies of income 
and wealth and is attacking strict egalitarianism) it nevertheless 
supports views that dismiss comparative perspectives that are at the 
core of inequality concerns, and, in this sense, also at the core of the 
notion of relative poverty.  
From a sufficiency perspective, we might be interested in reducing 
inequalities for instrumental reasons. This argument would have the 
following structure: we have a normative claim, concerning the value 
of sufficiency and establishing the primary concern with poverty; and 
an empirical fact, connecting poverty and inequality. In light of this 
our concern with inequality has a derivative moral significance and 
empirical evidence is of central importance in order to support this 
relationship. 
3.  Poverty 
 
As we saw, ascribing normative significance to sufficiency rather than 
inequality gives us reasons to prioritize concerns about poverty. In 
this view, inequality does not have an independent moral significance, 
but it can be of instrumental importance as a cause of insufficiency. 
At the same time sufficiency views need not be as narrow as 
Frankfurt’s. In fact, answers to the question ‘enough of what?’ can be 
articulated in various forms: for example, in terms of resources, 
welfare or capabilities.  
 
Capability approaches (Sen 1980, 1999; Nussbaum, 1988, 2000) 
have been particularly prominent in the discourse surrounding the 
analysis of poverty (Hick, 2012) and allow us to develop an 
understanding of poverty that is broader than material resources. 
Capability approaches are concerned with what is necessary for 
human functioning: what matters is not what you possess, or how 
happy or satisfied you are, but what you are able to ‘do or be’. So, 
while a functioning is what a person can ‘do or be’ (such as achieving 
nourishment, health, a decent life span, self-respect and so on); a 
capability is the freedom to achieve a functioning, which does not 
pertain just to fixed personal traits and divisible resources, but to 
one’s “mutable traits, social relations and norms, and the structure of 
opportunities, public goods, and public spaces” (Anderson 1999). 
From this perspective, poverty is viewed as the deprivation of certain 
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basic capabilities, and these can vary, as Sen has argued, ‘from such 
elementary physical ones as being well nourished, being adequately 
clothed and sheltered, avoiding preventable morbidity, and so forth, 
to more complex social achievements such as taking part in the life 
of the community, being able to appear in public without shame, and 
so on’ (Sen, 1995, 15). As a result, capability approaches 
acknowledge the multidimensional nature of poverty, with a broader 
scope than focusing solely on ‘material’ poverty. While capability 
approaches are compatible with different principles of distribution 
(from strict egalitarianism to the Rawlsian difference principle), 
Nussbaum has developed a list of core capabilities which offers 
universal standards to set a social minimum that is ‘worthy of the 
dignity of the human being’ (Nussbaum, 2000, 5). Nussbaum thus 
endorses a ‘sufficiency view’ of capabilities according to which the 
goal of social policy is to bring each person to a threshold level of 
sufficiency in each capability (Nussbaum, 2006). This minimum, 
defined in terms of capabilities, is a way of measuring and defining 
poverty but it is also a condition for a just society that all governments 
must respect and all societies must meet.  
 
While we find a growing adoption of multi-dimensional approaches to 
the measurement of poverty - such as the Global Multi-Dimensional 
Poverty Index (Alkire et al., 2015) - it remains an open question 
whether and how it is possible to operationalize the capability 
approach for the measurement and assessment of poverty.3 There 
remain fundamental difficulties in defining what counts as the 
appropriate threshold and how this is to be set in a meaningful 
manner. 
 
Nevertheless, even if we maintain a definition of poverty that is closer 
to the ordinary understanding, as material deprivation, we can see 
that the reason that we should be especially concerned with poverty 
derives from its being the most important cause of deprivation 
understood more broadly. On the one hand, debates originated from 
                                                 
3 As a broader attempt in this direction, it is important to mention the Equality 
Measurement Framework (EMF), which represents a multi-dimensional approach 
to monitor inequalities in the position of individuals and groups in terms of their 
substantive freedoms. EMF encompasses aspects of equal treatment, equality of 
opportunity and equality of outcome and draws on the capability approach as 
one of its key inputs (see Burchardt and Vizard, 2011). 
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capability approaches allow us to consider the limits of the ordinary 
focus on the lack of material resources for explaining all deprivation: 
because of this we cannot assume that relieving poverty will be 
enough to eliminate deprivation. However, at the same time, these 
approaches point at a broader social justice justification for our 
concern with poverty.  
 
There is an interesting parallel to draw here with the social equality 
considerations we explored above: there we saw that the ability to 
participate in the life of society does not have disparities and lack of 
resources as only constraints. Here we find a normative inseparability 
of the concepts of poverty and deprivation understood more broadly, 
in the same way in which we saw distributional inequalities being 
constitutive, but not exhaustive, of the concept of social inequality. 
In fact, we can hold that these concerns with poverty and social 
inequality are not mutually exclusive, but instead invite us to 
understand their relationships within an overarching concern with 
deprivation: in this perspective, poverty, as lack of material 
resources, and inequalities, material as well as relational, all raise 
normative concerns because they are barriers to people’s capabilities 
to function in ways that are elemental to human life.  
 
In this perspective, we can see that a principle of sufficiency does not 
necessarily exclude an interest in relative poverty.4 This follows from 
recognizing that human beings have vital needs for health but also 
social needs to be included in their social groups. What is enough to 
meet these social needs, for example to function as a participant in a 
system of mutual cooperation, and stand as equal in society, varies 
with cultural norms, individual circumstances and natural 
environment. Particular community and status needs bring the 
concern with relative poverty to the forefront, because not only the 
latter can lead to social exclusion, but can in turn be one of its by-
products. This is the case for example because the stigma that 
characterizes certain groups standing in relative poverty can 
                                                 
4 From a capability perspective, poverty is viewed as the deprivation of certain 
basic capabilities and Sen, for example, holds that prevailing standards will 
influence the selection of relevant capabilities (e.g. Sen, 1984: 84-85). 
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constitute a barrier to the development of redistribution policies.5 A 
broader approach to deprivation invites us to investigate these 
seemingly reinforcing mechanisms.  
The views explored so far discussed how poverty is a fundamental 
social justice concern. There is, however, another powerful 
perspective that puts ‘humanity before justice’ (Campbell, 2007), by 
stressing humanitarian reasons to care about poverty. According to 
these views our core moral reason to care about poverty springs from 
the sheer horrible suffering that is associated with it. According to 
Campbell (2007) this concern is compatible but distinct from 
instrumental justifications (that see, for example, subsistence as a 
precondition for other human activities, which in turn one might value 
for moral or non-moral reasons); but also from justifications based 
on the consequences of poverty, which are associated with the 
broader concerns with social exclusion discussed above. Ultimately, 
in this humanitarian perspective, poverty is an evil experienced by 
the poor and the core moral reason to care about it is the suffering 
“that lack of the means of subsistence causes: hunger, pain, misery, 
sickness, and death” (63). Humanitarian concern gives rise to a 
positive duty to help the poor. Along these lines, Singer (1972) has 
famously developed what is probably the most influential version of 
this humanitarian view in relation to global poverty. 
Singer’s position points first at the basic normative claim that 
“suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are 
bad” (Singer, 1972, 231). Next, Singer introduces the principle 
according to which “if it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable 
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (ibid.). Because 
alleviating poverty is in our power, we have the moral obligation to 
do so. This kind of view has some important consequences for our 
approach to poverty: on the one hand, in promoting desirable 
consequences for the poor, humanitarian aid is not sensitive to how 
a certain state of affairs came to be. Our moral obligation holds, 
irrespective of who is suffering or why that suffering came about. In 
light of this, Singer’s position seeks to alleviate poverty regardless of 
                                                 
5 For an analysis of the problems attached to the idea of relative poverty, especially 
in relation to positional goods and identification of the relevant reference groups 
see Wolff (2015) and Wolff et al. 2015. 
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its being the result of unjust institutions or natural disasters. Alleged 
moral failures of those in need also do not allow exculpatory 
rationales for those who can offer aid. On this view, poverty is “the 
basis of a universal, unqualified claim based on the moral 
relationships between those who suffer and those who can do 
something about it” (Campbell, 2007, 66). This position can lead to 
rather radical conclusions because it conceives of our duty to aid as 
demanded on all of us, as individuals, in accordance to our capacity 
and irrespective to proximity (Singer, 1972, 232).  
An in-depth discussion of humanitarian view and its critics cannot be 
fully explored here. However, it is worth pointing out that, aside from 
practical concerns with Singer’s solution (Wenar, 2011), there are 
difficulties in defining the limits of beneficence as an obligation. It is 
because our duty of beneficence does not specify exactly how much 
assistance we must provide to others that Kant defined it an imperfect 
duty (G 4:421).6 This thought can be drawn on from a libertarian 
perspective to claim that positive moral duties of charity, humanity 
and aid, while morally permissible, and even commendable, only call 
for a supererogatory, non-enforceable obligation. Duties of assistance 
would lack stringency and would leave to donors’ discretion how much 
to give, and to whom. While this position has room for compensation, 
for those cases in which poverty is the result of theft or violent 
aggression, and hence would accept the right of certain poor groups 
to receive assistance, it does not entail any universal right to 
subsistence. From this perspective it is good to help, but the poor 
have no right to be helped. It is in light of this that we find a common 
criticism to the humanitarian view claiming that it is too weak, 
pertaining to a moral ideal (Gert, 2005), as “charity”, rather than a 
moral obligation.  
Furthermore, we find authors advocating for a humanitarian concern 
with poverty claiming that “the principle of benevolence or ‘humanity’ 
(as in ‘humanitarian’) is based on the propriety of the elemental 
response of aiding another human being arising from seeing, 
imagining, or knowing of the suffering” (Campbell, 2007, 65). 
Appealing to benevolent sentiments is not unproblematic: on the one 
hand, there has been a long-standing discussion about the extent to 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of how the duty to relieve extreme poverty is an imperfect duty 
of charity, rather than a perfect duty of justice see O’Neill (1989, 225). 
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which our feelings can ground normativity and provide the basis 
justifying our concern (Korsgaard, 1996). According to this Kantian 
objection, “[m]oral feeling succeeds the moral concept, but does not 
produce it” (Kant, NF 19:150, 6757). Moreover, this might suggest 
an emphasis on compassion that brings to the forefront questions 
regarding the limits of empathy: on the one hand, the variance of 
feelings of empathy from person to person leaves undefined the 
suffering we are morally obliged to alleviate. On the other hand, while 
it might be that the extreme experiences discussed by these authors 
in the context of global poverty elicit this “elemental response of 
aiding”, these intuitions are not always clear. For example, in some 
cases, but not in others, painful experiences of the poor (e.g. shame, 
stress, fear of the future, absence of control over one’s destiny as 
well as degrading working conditions etc.)7 seem to be balanced 
against judgements about their responsibility. Appeals to 
humanitarian concerns are thus not as simple as it would appear and 
nuances underlying them deserve further attention.  
At the same time, some authors have emphasized that, unlike in the 
scenarios envisaged by Singer, our moral intuitions deciding what we 
should do regarding global poverty do concern the reasons why there 
is persistent poverty in the face of material abundance (Gomberg, 
2002). This kind of intuition has been prominently developed by 
Thomas Pogge (2002, 2007), according to whom people have the 
human right of being free from severe poverty and the persistence of 
poverty today. He sees causality as having a particular moral 
significance, making poverty a violation of human rights. According 
to Pogge, “severe poverty today, while no less horrific than that 
experienced by the early American settlers, is fundamentally different 
in context and causation. Its persistence is not forced on us by natural 
contingencies of soil, seeds, or climate. Rather, its persistence is 
driven by the ways that economic interactions are structured” (Pogge, 
2007, 3). Instead of solely focusing on the consequences, such as the 
suffering experienced by the poor, this view turns to the nature of the 
relations that brought these consequences about. Poverty is not 
simply a fact in the world, but instead, it is a foreseeable and 
avoidable harm, which sees institutions violating human rights 
through their policies, even if creating poverty was not the explicit 
                                                 
7 There is a vast literature on this topic. See Fleurbaey, 2007; Creegan et al., 
2009; Taylor-Gooby, 2013; Walker 2014. 
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aim of policy. Charity, towards which Pogge is not as critical as others 
(Gomberg, 2002) does not necessarily require the deeper structural 
and institutional changes that are needed to avoid infringing the 
rights of the poor. This makes Pogge’s view radically different from 
ones focused on humanitarian aid in two respects. On the one hand, 
because of the complexity of interrelations among individuals, it is 
hard to hold individual agents morally accountable; we do, however, 
all share a collective moral responsibility for our institutions and the 
structure of society. On the other hand, setting aside the question 
concerning our positive duty to help the poor, he stresses a strong 
negative duty not to harm them by imposing a political, economic and 
social order that systematically sustains poverty.  
One of the strengths of Pogge’s position is that it supports the 
urgency of acting against poverty even for those who only recognize 
the stringency of negative duties. There is, however, also substantial 
support to the idea that a human right to basic necessities imposes 
both negative and positive duties (Sen, 1982; Cruft, 2005; Ashford 
2007, Shue, 1996). Critics of Pogge’s approach point out that it is 
limited to the kind of impoverishment that other agents are causally 
and morally responsible for, while it also hinges on establishing 
complex causality in regards to poverty which is, in the literature, 
both elusive and controversial (Risse 2005; Cohen, 2010; Vizard, 
2006). In this sense, the humanitarian approach provides a rationale 
for our normative concern with poverty that is uncomplicated and 
does not need to be grounded on empirical assumptions regarding its 
causes. Moreover, it is important to stress that humanitarian positions 
do not exclude ideas of violation, justice and rights. For example, 
Campbell sees failures to implement humanitarian obligations as 
gross injustice, but he holds that issues concerning who causes 
poverty and how it comes about are not decisive in deeming it a 
violation of a human right. 
The idea that poverty constitutes a violation of the human rights of 
the poor has gained considerable prominence in the context of 
philosophical discussion of global poverty. Rights-based justifications 
of our fundamental concern with poverty see it as violating human 
rights in a moral sense. Moral obligations are the grounds for legal 
rights as well as the grounds for the legitimacy of institutions. Where 
poverty is considered as a violation of human rights (Pogge 2007, 
22 
Gewirth,1983, 2007, Ashford 2007; Cruft, Liao and Renzo, 2015) 
freedom from poverty is taken to be a right humans have simply in 
virtue of being human, hence constitutive to realizing valued features 
of human life. This can be understood in three ways: 1) as respecting 
human dignity (Griffin, 2008), especially in connection with agency 
and autonomy; 2) as promoting fundamental human interests 
(Tasioulas, 2007; 2015, Ashford 2007) and hence a good life; 3) as 
protecting the opportunity to meet human needs (Miller 2012), the 
conditions for a minimally decent life (these are needs all human 
beings have qua human beings and are not dependent on any specific 
goal).  
Rights-based approaches offer strong justifications for policies 
earmarked to eliminate poverty. At the same time, especially since 
they focus on subsistence rights and have been developed in relation 
to extreme poverty, understood predominantly in absolute terms, it 
might seem that such views do not in turn justify concerns with 
inequality (Gewirth, 1996, 72-73, 110). One might reach the same 
conclusions in regards to humanitarian views. This, however, need 
not be the case. One can hold that poverty is our primary normative 
concern, in virtue of being connected to basic human rights as a right 
to subsistence, or in virtue of humanitarian reasons. In both of these 
approaches, making it possible for the poor to escape poverty, 
especially extreme poverty, has priority over tackling distribution 
gaps. At the same time though, recognizing the priority of poverty 
“need not commit us to the very different assertion that this is all that 
justice requires” (De Vita, 2007, 108).8 Fleurbaey, for example, sees 
poverty and inequality inextricably connected to forms of oppression 
that represent, though in different degrees, a violation of human 
integrity and dignity. Fleurbaey (2007) sees poverty as a form of 
oppression, which is not fortuitous but rather serves the interests of 
the most advantaged who exploit the vulnerability of the poor. Where 
the wrong of poverty is associated to the oppressive nature of the 
relationship between rich and poor we find our normative concerns 
with poverty and inequality to be inextricably linked. In fact, in this 
view, it is inequality of wealth that introduces a distortion in 
economic, social and political relationships. Our normative concerns 
about inequality and poverty originate and are justified by the core 
                                                 
8 For how these arguments apply both at the domestic and international level see 
Beitz 2001, De Vita 2007. 
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commitment to respecting human integrity and dignity, which makes 
them both instances of violations of justice.  
More generally, there are both intrinsic and instrumental reasons 
why, even in a rights-based view primarily concerned with poverty, 
inequality of resources above the minimal threshold does matter, 
morally speaking, from the standpoint of justice. Inequality of wealth 
and income matters because, as we saw already in the previous 
section, they are associated with inequalities of social status that 
produce humiliation and undermine self-respect; but also because 
they are converted in imbalances of political power that undermine 
the political liberties of the least privileged (De Vita, 2007, 109).  
Finally, there are instrumental reasons for caring about inequalities 
that point at how the persistence of poverty is self-reinforcing and 
entrenched in a context of great inequality (Pogge, 2007, 4). 
Empirical evidence is essential to support or disprove these 
instrumental justifications. Importantly, this discussion shows that 
these different justifications are not mutually exclusive and allow for 
a pluralist approach. For example, while our ultimate grounds to 
attribute particular urgency to poverty over inequality might rely on 
a humanitarian approach, we can still hold practical reasons to be 
concerned with social justice and with inequality, both in order to 
define the mechanisms underlying poverty but also to formulate 
solutions.  
4.  Responsibility  
 
The question of responsibility has been lurking at the background of 
our discussion but deserves to be directly addressed. Issues of 
responsibility are central to much of the public debate surrounding 
measures and policies targeted to inequality and poverty. I will thus 
provide a brief discussion of how the philosophical debates about 
responsibility have been articulated in relation to inequality (3.1) and 
poverty (3.2). More generally, though, we can see how the issue of 
responsibility arises from the fact that inequality and poverty are 
distinctively human and social phenomena. As such, they bring to the 
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forefront questions regarding agency in a way that natural 
phenomena do not.9  
 
4.1. Responsibility and inequality 
 
This is particularly the case when it comes to a discussion of 
inequality: in fact, fairness and justice are notions that are connected 
to human actions and institutions. In the first section we saw Rawls 
presenting the difference principle, concerning distributional 
inequality, as a principle of justice, which he conceived as “the first 
virtue of social institutions” (1971, 3). Instead, luck egalitarianism 
focuses on individuals’ personal responsibility. Dworkin has famously 
incorporated a notion of responsibility within a theory of equality. He 
asks how people came to be in the certain position they are, 
distinguishing between bad ‘brute luck’ (such as having few talents 
or a disability) and ‘option luck’, which includes the results of freely 
made choices. It is possible to make individuals responsible for 
consequences that derive from their free choices, but society should 
aim at correcting inequalities due to mere bad luck (Dworkin, 1981b). 
Individuals’ active role in the production of goods is thus a key factor 
determining the ground of institutional intervention. Luck 
egalitarianism seems to propose an understanding of fairness which 
is in line with prevailing intuitions in society (Wolff et al, 2015) and 
supports the idea that we do not have duties of justice towards those 
who can be held rightfully responsible for their situation. Importantly, 
Dworkin’s luck egalitarianism is offered as an ideal theory and hence 
it assumes fair background conditions to be in place before ascribing 
full responsibility.  
 
This view contrasts sharply with Rawls’s own dismissal of desert 
considerations: he holds that these could not have any role in 
distributive justice, since undeserved factors have a major influence 
on all would-be desert bases (Sher 1987, 22). Indeed, how to draw 
the distinction between freely made choice and bad luck has attracted 
much debate (Arneson, 1989, Cohen, 1989), and it might be 
particularly difficult to apply luck egalitarian principles in practice 
                                                 
9 This is not to say that poverty does not also result from natural disaster or natural 
conditions, but as Lotter (2011) notices, zoo animals might suffer from cruelty or 
neglect but not poverty. Wild animals starve but do not live in poverty. Poverty, 
thus, seems to be related in some way to humanity. 
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(Wolff et al, 2015): on the one hand, not all choices are equally free 
and it is particularly difficult to ascribe responsibilities for choices 
made under complex circumstances, especially for those at risk of 
poverty. On the other hand, it would seem demeaning to say that 
those in poverty are never responsible for the consequences of their 
choices (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007). These issues are connected to a 
large debate surrounding the notion of choice, which is central to 
agency and as such connected to the concept of human dignity10. 
Furthermore, these principles have to be balanced against practical 
concerns: so, for example, luck egalitarians might want to exclude 
society’s obligation to accommodate disability resulting from faulty 
driving (Arneson, 1990; Rakowski, 1991); however, high 
administrative costs might discourage setting up such a system 
(Anderson, 1999). In general, we can see that, in practice, potential 
instrumental reasons (in relation to efficiency, social cohesion, 
poverty reduction etc.) might prescribe to reduce certain inequalities 
even where these would be of no concern from a luck-egalitarian 
perspective.  
 
Anderson (1999) points at more fundamental difficulties with luck-
egalitarian principles and sees them as standing in utter opposition 
to a conception of social, or democratic, equality. The ‘comparative’ 
understanding of equality that luck egalitarianism assumes (Temkin, 
2001) contrasts a ‘relational’ notion of equality. According to 
Anderson luck-egalitarian desert principles lead, on the one hand, to 
exclude some citizens, as we have seen in relation to the disabled: 
for example, she argues, the dependency of care takers is taken as a 
voluntary deviance from a falsely universalized norm of self-
sufficiency associated with wage-earning. Ultimately, she argues, 
luck-egalitarian approaches support a deficit model that clashes 
dramatically with the goals of social equality: it excludes people 
                                                 
10 Where libertarian perspectives appeal to an unconstrained will and focus on the 
act of choosing (free from imposition); liberal egalitarian as well as capability 
approaches conceive the processes of choice as rooted in one’s context, never 
independent of material conditions. In these respects, structural factors bear on 
the range and quality of options and affect the processes underlying choice. 
Capability approaches have placed particular attention on the phenomenon of 
adaptation (Sen 1987). See Nussbaum (1997, 2008) for a discussion of choice 
and human dignity juxtaposing libertarian perspectives to Rawlsian and capability 
approaches. For a critique of the very notion of human dignity as an essentially 
individualistic concept see Gutman (1985), Claassen (2014). 
26 
through stigmatizing pity or intrusive judgement that clashes with 
privacy and liberty. While it is not possible to explore this debate here, 
it is important to understand the essentially individualistic framework 
luck egalitarians adopt. This means that while we might understand 
luck-egalitarians advocating for the elimination of horizontal 
inequalities (based on circumstances outside people’s control such as 
race, gender, disability), responsibility and desert are attached to 
individual choices and this can lead to particular exclusions within 
groups.  
 
It is important to note, however, that the core ideas underpinning the 
luck-egalitarian notion of fairness are at the foundation of a 
substantial growing body of economics literature centred around the 
notion of equality of opportunity (Barros et al. 2009; Roemer 1998; 
Brunori et al. 2013; Fleurbaey and Peragine 2009).11 This research 
seeks to operationalize the notion of equality of opportunity 
distinguishing it from income inequality and inequality of outcome 
more generally. On the one hand, this shift of focus hopes to facilitate 
political and policy consensus. On the other hand, while recognising 
cross-country variations and the importance of understanding specific 
contextual challenges (Barros et al. 2009), this empirical evidence 
has made important steps in investigating the relation between 
inequalities of income and opportunities. For instance, Brunori et al. 
(2013) suggest that an important portion of income inequality cannot 
be attributed to differences in individual efforts or responsibility, and 
see inequalities in income and opportunities as both endogenously 
determined (13). The correlation between income inequality and 
inequality of opportunity is also consistent with the empirical 
literature on social mobility and points at a negative correlation 
between inequality and mobility (Corak 2013). This supports the idea 
that higher inequality skews opportunity and lowers intergenerational 
mobility. More generally, however, the discussion of this empirical 
research allows us to refocus the debate surrounding inequality and 
responsibility, while also problematizing the notion of choice: for a 
theory of equality of opportunity to become operationally or 
empirically meaningful, one must decide which factors should be 
                                                 
11 See Barros et al. (2009, 30) and Roemer (1998) in particular, for a discussion 
of how the instruments developed by this research (such as the Human 
Opportunity Index) are based on an “egalitarian” rather than a “meritocratic” 
framework to conceive fairness. 
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classified as circumstances beyond the control of the individual, and 
which should be counted as choices for which individuals are to be 
held responsible. This, on the one hand, hinges on our understanding 
of the mechanisms underlying these relations12 and their bearing on 
policy solutions (Bourguignon et al. 2007); on the other hand, it calls 
for a robust understanding distinguishing between a direct effect of 
circumstances on outcomes and an indirect effect via choice or effort. 
 
4.2. Responsibility and poverty 
 
In relation to poverty, we have briefly touched upon Pogge’s idea that 
our moral concern with poverty is connected to the causes of its 
persistence. At the same time, public debate has shared the intuition 
that there is a significant difference between those who are in poverty 
through no fault of their own and those who are responsible for their 
condition. Where some see the behaviour of those in poverty to be a 
key factor of the persistence of poverty (Karelis, 2007), a consistent 
portion of the philosophical discussion surrounding poverty points at 
its effects on agency. Where poverty is seen as reducing real freedom, 
some choices are choices only in appearance (Fleurbaey, 2007). So, 
for example, Christman (1998) questions a common misconception 
about the incentives structure of the poor that sees labour as 
constituting a disutility for them. He argues that such claims are 
based on a misunderstanding that makes “independence” rather than 
“autonomy” a goal of social policy. He argues that, when we 
acknowledge the value and the place of interdependency in our lives, 
we cannot consider ‘dependence’ as an evil to eliminate, but we 
should rather see “autonomy” as a basic value when discussing 
welfare programs. Autonomy, unlike “independence” is not 
committed to the deceivingly neutral assumption of a life of wage 
labour and paid employment as the norm; moreover, Christman 
argues, autonomy is essential for both democracy and markets 
because they both require the choices of participants to be made from 
a condition which truly reflects an authentic, non-distorted appraisal 
of their interests. Since the incentive structure of welfare to work 
programs is such that employment decisions are taken from a 
position of deprivation and diminished autonomy, the resultant 
choices/outcomes will likely be ones from which the person will be, 
                                                 
12 For a focus on institutions in Europe see Checchi et al. 2016. 
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upon critical reflection, deeply alienated. Programs that induce 
market entrance without securing autonomy conditions are, in a 
sense, self-defeating.  
 
At the same time, institutions, rather than individuals, can be seen 
as fundamentally responsible for promoting human relations and 
conditions that are fair and fulfill fundamental needs. As we saw, 
rights-based views see poverty as violation of human rights and point 
at our collective moral responsibility for the terms of our institutional 
structure, in light of the foreseeability and avoid-ability of poverty. 
We can see how structural responsibility is particularly central for 
rights-based views: the legitimacy of institutions is in this sense seen 
as dependent on their fairness and on their ability to respect moral 
rights, including welfare rights. These moral rights ground 
institutions, which are meant to protect them and translate them into 
legal rights. While it is not possible to explore these positions in detail, 
I will point at challenges that anybody wishing to hold a right-based 
view of poverty should answer. On the one hand, Geuss (2001) holds 
that welfare rights are characterized by a problem of enforceability, 
based on the impossibility of identifying duty bearers. O’Neill (1996) 
has argued that positive duties raise the issue of claimability: 
subsistence rights, as positive rights, do not allow to definitely 
connect one right to one duty and result in weaker obligations. These 
objections see ‘welfare rights’ as pure ‘manifesto rights’ (Tasioulas, 
2007): welfare rights violate the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ maxim and are 
thus disqualified from being a genuine right of all human beings. 
Replies to these arguments have explored the relationship between 
rights and duties: for example, Shue (1996) questions the 
positive/negative distinction by debunking the one-to-one relation 
between duties and rights and adopting the idea of dynamic, 
“successive waves of duties” (Waldron, 1989). Ashford (2007) argues 
that the Kantian distinction between imperfect/perfect duties does 
not in fact map the one between positive/negative duties.  
 
This discussion points at how, if we are to understand the role 
responsibility plays in shaping our concerns with poverty and 
inequality, issues of causation and of possible solutions need to take 
the forefront. At the same time, it is important to point at 
philosophical debates that surround the very notion of responsibility: 
for example, the work of Iris Marion Young (2003) invites us to 
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question a “liability” conception of responsibility (causally connecting 
agents to harms) and she points at how this fails to understand 
structural injustice which, while it is socially caused, is not resulting 
from the action of few specifiable actors. According to Young, we need 
to acknowledge the shortcomings of this dominant conception of 
responsibility because it is inadequate to evaluate the relationships of 
individual actors to large scale social processes and systemic 
injustices.  
 
In concluding this section, we can point at certain asymmetries 
between the notions of inequality and poverty in relation to this idea 
of responsibility: in relation to inequality, the desert principle defines 
the very notion of fairness, and hence, in the ideal theory formulation 
given by Dworkin, it bears directly on the forms of inequality equity 
justifies. Instead, since our concerns with poverty are not solely 
justified in terms of social justice, we can see that issues of 
responsibility do not have the same application (for example, in a 
humanitarian perspective). On the other hand, there remain parallels 
between the two notions in regards to the intuitive appeal of the idea 
that our choices affect our justice claims. Most importantly, in regards 
to both, practical and conceptual difficulties in defining “chosen” 
behaviour arise. This invites us to problematize the notion of choice, 
which is central to agency and as such connected to the concept of 
human dignity. At the same time, current empirical debates bring to 
the forefront of discussion the mechanisms underlying inequality of 
opportunity, underscoring its relation to income inequality and 
inequality of outcomes, but also to social mobility and development. 
5.  Conclusions 
 
By way of conclusion, I will address more concisely one of the main 
questions that prompted this analysis of the philosophical literature: 
to what extent do our concerns with poverty and inequality overlap? 
As a starting point, we can see how these might seem to be based on 
rather different grounds:  
 
 On the one hand, we have seen how ideal theories of social 
justice ask a question about the conditions for a just society. 
Rawls’ prominent approach defines the grounds of social justice 
granting a priority to the notion of inequality over poverty. The 
30 
difference principle, for example, does not equate the “worst 
off” and the “poor”: while these notions can coherently overlap 
in practice, Rawls’s theory addresses fairness in relation to the 
former, going beyond confronting poverty. We have also seen 
how, in such ideal approach, poverty is considered an evil that 
follows from social injustice.  
 
 This kind of view stands in opposition to one, developed by 
Frankfurt, that sees a principle of sufficiency as grounding of 
social justice and envisages a sharp contrast between 
sufficiency and the comparative approach that is entailed by our 
concern with inequality. In this perspective, a view that sees 
sufficiency as a goal can have incidental, contingent and 
instrumental reasons to care about inequality and support 
redistribution policies, but it is not committed, in principle, to a 
normative idea of fairness that prioritizes tackling inequality.  
 
 These kinds of position thus draw a sharp distinction between a 
principle of sufficiency (which would seem to justify our concern 
with poverty, defined in a non-comparative manner) and 
egalitarian principles, such as the difference principle, that focus 
on reducing inequalities. What emerged from our analysis, 
however, is the possibility of endorsing a broader social justice 
justification for which inequality and poverty do not generate 
competing concerns, but see, instead, our normative reasons to 
care about both overlap. Capability approaches, as well as 
theories focused on social and relational inequality, seem to 
point in this direction. These approaches do not try to define the 
grounds of justice (its principles as well as necessary and 
sufficient conditions). Instead, their point of departure is the 
broad real world social justice concern with social inequalities 
and deprivation. From the standpoint of a broader conception of 
social justice, we find that poverty and inequality are 
constitutive of human deprivation. This allows for a framework 
that can focus on their relationship, bringing to the forefront 
their mutually reinforcing relationships. For this task, an 
understanding of the mechanisms underlying these phenomena 
is essential in order to tackle human deprivation.  
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 This means that, in light of a broader social justice concern, we 
can prioritize poverty, because we consider that it is the most 
important cause of deprivation, but this does not need to 
dismiss our concerns with inequality. I have also pointed out 
how a conception of social justice that focuses on patterns of 
socialization and not solely on patterns of distribution does not 
deny the importance of material inequalities: these are 
considered a key determinant of broader social inequalities, 
inextricably linked to their reinforcement. Most importantly, 
though, what emerges from this picture is that concerns with 
inequality and poverty need not to be mutually exclusive. In this 
sense both poverty (understood as material deprivation but not 
solely identified with low income) and inequality (as 
distributional but also social/relational) constitute injustice.  
 
 We have, however, also pointed at arguments that assign a 
unique normative value to poverty, for example, in light of 
humanitarian concerns. By putting ‘humanity before justice’ 
these arguments do not hinge on our conceptions of social 
justice. This position can lead to the weak claim that we have 
supererogatory charitable and compassionate motives; but it 
can also lead to more stringent endorsement of positive duties 
and moral obligation to aid. This obligation is quite substantial: 
it holds irrespective of who is suffering and why that suffering 
came about; it binds all individuals; and also puts into question 
the focus on domestic poverty. At the same time our discussion 
emphasized some important difficulties with humanitarian views 
in specifying the limits of such obligation.  
 
 We also explored positions that ascribe a normative priority to 
poverty by conceiving it as a violation of human rights. These 
views, which, by being developed especially in the context of 
global poverty, privilege an absolute understanding of the 
concept, seem prima facie to have no place for the concept of 
inequality. This need not be the case. On the one hand, we saw 
how one can see concerns with both poverty and inequality as 
originating from the same core reference to human dignity and 
integrity. In this sense poverty is prior because it constitutes a 
higher degree of violation of human dignity as a failure to meet 
basic needs, interests or as an infringement of basic rights.  
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 On the other hand, one can hold that the priority accorded to 
poverty (in light of humanitarian or human-rights concerns) 
does not entail that poverty is all that matters from a standpoint 
of justice. This means that it is possible to advocate for a 
pluralist view that incorporates different reasons of normative 
concern. So, for example, one can prioritize poverty while also 
allowing that inequality matters, both in itself and inasmuch as 
it is instrumental to poverty: thus seeing poverty as entrenched 
and sustained in a context of inequality. The priority of poverty 
does not exclude a pluralist approach that endorses social 
justice concerns, relating to both material and relational 
inequalities, as well as instrumental concerns that are based on 
empirical connections between poverty and inequality.  
 
 Instrumental concerns about both poverty and inequality can 
also ascribe value to these phenomena inasmuch as they are 
related to other outcomes. From this standpoint we might care 
about poverty or inequality inasmuch as they affect growth, 
efficiency, social cohesion and so forth. In general, though, it is 
important to stress that all instrumental arguments hinge on 
establishing empirical relationships between poverty and 
inequality and the phenomena they are instrumental to.  
 
 With this in mind, we can see that when we claim that it is 
possible to hold a pluralist approach, we conceive it as building 
connections among these different reasons (instrumental and 
intrinsic, moral and non-moral) rather than considering them 
mutually exclusive. The capability approach seems to allow such 
a view. We have seen how capability approaches are concerned 
with ensuring people’s capabilities to function in ways that are 
elemental to human life. Material deprivation is probably the 
most important barrier to this goal. At the same time, material 
inequalities can be seen as an important determinant of unequal 
treatment and discrimination, which are constitutive of 
deprivation, broadly understood. So, from a capability approach 
perspective, these aspects of social equality are also necessary 
for one’s capability to function. At the same time, 
instrumentally, income redistribution is likely needed to meet 
the thresholds set by the capability approaches.  
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 Finally, questions of responsibility emerge both in relation to 
poverty and inequality and complicate the picture. On the one 
hand, the very fact that these are distinctively human 
phenomena brings to the forefront issues of agency in a way 
natural phenomena do not. On the other hand, both at the 
individual and structural level, we find parallel problems in 
establishing how certain states of affair came to be and how a 
meaningful notion of responsibility should be defined. While the 
discourse of responsibility and desert is prominent in the way 
our society approaches poverty and inequality, these 
considerations invite us to take into account the limits of our 
intuitions, and require us to focus on the causes and processes 
underlying poverty and inequality.  
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